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Chapter 7

Prospects for Widow Poverty
David R. Weir and Robert J. Willis

One important challenge for aging policy in the United States is the high
poverty rate of older women living alone. A recent survey found that elderly
single women were the poorest group among the aged, the only group with
poverty rates significantly higher than the population as a whole, and a
group much worse off (in relative terms) than older single women in other
countries (Holtz-Eakin and Smeeding 1994). These findings come after
decades of significant progress during which poverty rates declined for
women in all marital status groups. Nevertheless, poverty persists, particularly among non married women (see Table 1). Divorced women fare worst
of all, suggesting that attention to the economic consequences of divorce
should be a concern for aging policy. Nevertheless, our attention here is on
widowhood: nearly half the elderly poor are widowed women and their
poverty rates are substantially higher than for widowed men.
Financial arrangements made during marriage can largely determine the
relative prospects of husbands and wives in the event of a spousal death, and
before these women were widows, they were wives. The widespread availability of life insurance offers a contract mechanism whose purpose is to
reduce the differences in economic status between marriage and widowhood, whatever the composition of other financial resources available to the
couple. The fact that so many couples are not poor, but so many widows are,
raises questions about how couples make financial decisions prior to one
spouse's death.! Of course the problem is not limited to the poor: earlier
research found that many wives at all levels of income faced reduced living
standards in the event of their husbands' deaths (Auerbach and Kotlikoff,
1987). The impact of widowhood on economic status thus raises important
questions of public policy. For example, some propose redistributing social
security benefits toward widows and away from married couples (Burkhauser 1994; Sandell and lams 1997). Such reforms would be self-defeating if
couples responded to them by reducing life insurance, savings, or other
private financial provision for widows.
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TABLE 1:
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Poverty in the Population 65 and Older by Sex and Marital Status, 1994.
Population 65+
(thousands)

Fraction ofPoor
(%)

Share ofElderly
Poverty (%)

Marital Status

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

Married
Widowed
Divorced
Never-married

9735
1755
681
543

9735
8636
1091
768

4.8
12.2
16.5
18.0

4.0
20.0
25.3
28.7

13.0
5.9
3.1
2.7

13.0
48.4
7.7
6.]

SaUTr.e: Authors' calculations using data reported in Grad (1996).

In this chapter we examine the financial situation of married couples with
special attention to the life-contingency structure of the various assets that
comprise couples' wealth. The data corne from the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), a survey that provides unusually detailed information on family finances (see Chapter 1). We focus here on 3,362 married women who
were age 51-61 in 1992. All statistical results are weighted by the women's
person-level sampling weight in the HRS to ensure that the results are nationally representative.
Mter describing the methods used to construct household wealth measures, we then compute how much would remain after the death of the
husband or the wife, if that death occurred immediately. Next we convert
wealth in each of the three possible surviving states into the sustainable
annual consumption (annuity) that the couple or widow(er) could achieve.
The results are then compared with earlier research on the adequacy of
provision for prospective widows. We also compare survivors' sustainable
consumption levels to poverty thresholds. This then indicates potential poverty rates in each survival state.

The Wealth of Married Couples
The standard problem in retirement planning is to provide for a relatively smooth lifetime consumption stream drawing on a varied mix of income sources and savings. An important source of uncertainty in this planning problem is uncertainty regarding age at death. In the case of a single
decision-maker, the role oflife insurance and life annuities in responding to
that uncertainty has been extensively examined (Yaari 1965; Fischer 1973;
Lewis 1979; Bernheim 1991). By contrast, we ask here how uncertainty over
the timing of spousal deaths complicates the problem of smoothing income
for a married couple, and how life insurance can assist in that contingent
allocation.
Previous research by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 1991) has taken a
related tack in assessing the "adequacy" oflife insurance purchases. Those
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authors offered an intuitively appealing assessment of a couple's financial
situation, by investigating the sustainable level of consumption per person
while married, and comparing it with the sustainable level of consumption
available to a widow following her husband's death. Our methods are similar, with some improvements made possible by the strengths of the HRS
data. First, we convert a couple's claims to future income such as social
security or labor earnings into assets, by computing their expected present
discounted values (i.e., discounting by both an interest rate and the probability the person survives to receive the income). These assets are then
combined with other net worth to arrive at the couple's total lifetime wealth.
This wealth stock is then converted to a sustainable consumption level by
assuming the purchase of actuarially fair life annuities, a process that translates an initial stock of wealth into a constant flow of income until death. 2

Conventional Assets (Net Worth)
We begin by examining the most familiar component of wealth, namely, net
worth. This is the value of all real and financial assets owned by a couple, less
their debts; it includes net housing equity, stocks, and savings accounts. One
strength of the HRS interview design is its persistence in inquiring into the
value of conventional assets. Respondents who declined to give dollar figures were then asked follow-up questions in the form of "brackets" to place
the amount of holdings into ranges ofvalues. As a result, the HRS obtained a
more complete and accurate accounting of wealth information than most
other surveys (Smith 1995). Because these conventional assets are not contingent on survival, we assume that they are 100 percent heritable between
spouses. 3 In terms of their ability to provide consumption, therefore, these
assets afford a greater consumption stream to a single survivor than to an
individual while married (since we assume the assets are shared).

Present Value of Future Income in the HRS
A household's wealth also includes claims to future income. We measure
this wealth for HRS women as the expected present discounted value of
these future income streams. From the standpoint of a married couple,
there are three possible future states in which income might be received:
while both are alive, when only the husband survives, and when only the wife
survives. The life-contingency of a particular type of future income is defined by the state or states in which it is payable. The generic form of such a
present discounted expected value calculation is:
T

PV; =

2:
<=0

Y;,t,s

* P"S *

(1 + r)-l
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where Yi,t,s is income from source i in year t in survival state s, Pt,s is the
probability that a couple is in survival state s in year t, and ris a real interest
rate (which we assume throughout this chapter to be three percent).
Given the way many income flows are structured, it will be useful to refer
to three general types of life-contingent income streams. Single-life annuities are received over the life of an individual and do not depend on the
partner's survival. For example, the husband's expected future earnings
constitute the main component of wealth that is contingent on the husband
living but not on the wife's survival. The other two types of contingent
claims involve both spouses' survival probabilities in combination. Joint life
annuities are those streams paid to the couple only while both partners
survive. Survivor annuities are streams payable to a surviving partner only
after the death of the other spouse. All other types of life-contingent future
claims can be represented as some combination of these three types. For
example, a 'Joint and survivor" annuity that pays one dollar while the couple survives, fifty cents to a surviving widow, and one dollar to a surviving
widower is a combination of a one-dollarjoint life annuity, a fifty-cent widow
annuity, and a one-dollar widower annuity.
To estimate survival probabilities, we use the Social Security Administration's single-year-of-age life table projections for single-year birth cohorts by sex (Bell, Wade, and Goss 1992). Using this, we assign a mortality schedule based on his or her year of birth for each individual in the
HRS. In this chapter we do not consider other determinants of differential
mortality.4
Next we calculate present values for future earnings, pensions, and social
security payments. Briefly, future earnings are projected using workers' current earnings and their expected future labor force participation rates.
Pension wealth is similarly derived from respondent reports of their pension
eligibility and expected accruals. Social security wealth is based on the Earnings and Benefits File (EBF) , a restricted data supplement produced by
Mitchell et al. (this volume) using Social Security Administration records
linked to the HRS sample. We made imputations for respondents lacking
records. To convert wealth into consumption annuities we use the same life
tables as those used to convert income into wealth.

Empirical Wealth Estimates of Couples
and Potential Widows
Married Couples
Summary characteristics for the various components of couples' wealth appear in Table 2 for the 3,362 married couples with age-eligible wives in
wave I of the HRS, weighted by the wife's person-level sampling weight.
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2:

Characteristics of Couple Wealth (HRS age-eligible wives)

Component of
Wealth

Mean

Share
of total

Median

($)

($)

Coeffof
variation

Gini

Share of
top 10%

Percent
zero

Housing
Non-housing
HDCnow
WDCnow
HDBnow
WDBnow
SS to date
H DB to date
WDB to date
H earn future
Wearn future
SS future
H DB future
WDBfuture
H DC future
WDCfuture

80326
230958
15892
4596
34565
3408
162846
36641
18075
115263
55882
10234
8343
5342
4675
1286

0.10
0.29
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.21
0.05
0.02
0.15
0.07
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00

60000
71000
0
0
0
0
173170
0
0
75754
28633
4876
0
0
0
0

1.37
2.46
4.44
5.77
2.40
6.63
0.33
3.23
5.97
1.38
1.46
1.36
3.36
3.28
5.09
5.60

0.52
0.74
0.92
0.95
0.86
0.98
0.18
0.88
0.92
0.61
0.65
0.65
0.89
0.91
0.94
0.95

0.34
0.61
0.88
0.96
0.71
1.00
0.15
0.78
0.90
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.81
0.88
0.93
0.99

0.11
0.04
0.75
0.83
0.75
0.96
0.02
0.72
0.79
0.28
0.38
0.35
0.74
0.80
0.82
0.89

Total

788333

1.00

604864

0.94

0.38

0.30

0.00

Assets
Pensions
Social security
Earnings

311284
132823
171145

0.39
0.17
0.22

148500
61615
129878

1.93
1.73
1.09

0.63
0.67
0.52

0.51
0.46
0.33

0.03
0.27
0.14

Owned
Promised
Expected

331772
217561
239000

0.42
0.28
0.30

165000
191777
190880

1.87
0.79
0.92

0.62
0.29
0.45

0.49
0.25
0.30

0.02
0.01
0.05

S01tTCe: Authors' calculations from HRS data.
Notes: H = husband; W = wife; DB = defined benefit; DC = defined contribution; SS = social security.

The top panel of Table 2 gives a detailed decomposition of the different
components, while the second and third panels summarize in alternative ways. Total wealth averaged $788,000, with a median of $605,000. Although the minimum was a substantial negative amount, there were very
few couples with non positive amounts of total wealth. Wealth is unequally
distributed, with 30 percent held by the top 10 percent and a Gini coefficient of .38.
The leading components of wealth are nonhousing conventional assets
(29 percent), social security wealth (21 percent), expected husband's future earnings (15 percent), housing equity (10 percent), and wife's expected future earnings (7 percent). All private pension sources combined
amount to 17 percent. As might be expected, wealth components are more
unequally distributed than the total. Compare housing and nonhousing
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TABLE 3: Correlations Among Components of Couple Wealth

Total
Total
Housing
Financial
Social
security
Husband
pension
Wife
pension
Future social
security
Husband
future
Wife future

Housing

Financial

Social
Security

Husband
Pension

Wife
Pension

Future

SS

Husband
Future

1.00
0.34
0.85
0.18

1.00
0.19
0.14

1.00
0.11

1.00

0.36

0.12

0.08

0.08

1.00

0.21

0.03

0.02

0.06

0.06

1.00

0.22

-0.04

0.02

-0.12

-0.00

0.04

1.00

0.57

0.10

0.21

-om

0.21

0.02

0.40

1.00

0.26

0.02

0.04

-0.01

0.00

0.13

0.43

0.15

Source: Authors' calculations from HRS data.
Notes: N=3,362 married couples with age-eligible wives. Correlation coefficients weighted by wife's personlevel weight (inverse of sampling probability). Pension wealth includes pensions already claimed or
credited. Future wealth includes expected future earnings as well as future contributions or credit~ to
pensions. See also Table 2.

wealth, for example: both have median values near $65,000, but ownership
of nonhousing wealth is more concentrated and its mean is therefore much
larger. Pensions are also unequally distributed, even when summed over the
different types. By contrast, social security is distributed more equally than
total wealth.
The bottom panel of Table 2 divides wealth into three categories: assets
owned outright or already paying annuitized income, promised future payments based on past contributions (primarily social security and pensions),
and expected future payments that depend on future work effort. In this
cohort, the share of wealth dependent on future work is still quite large, at
30 percent.
Another way in which the components of wealth contribute to the inequality of total wealth is through their pattern of correlation, as shown in
Table 3. Most of the correlation coefficients are positive, suggesting very
little compensating variation in the components of wealth between categories, between spouses, or even between past and future. The rich are apparently consistently rich. This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the composition of wealth by decile of wealth. Conventional assets increase with
decile of total wealth, as does pension wealth and expected future earnings.
Social security increases rapidly through the 70th percentile and then remains roughly constant. Thus, social security is like other components of
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Decile of Couple Wea~h

Figure 1. Sources of HRS couple wealth by decile, dollar value, Source: Authors'
calculations using HRS data.

wealth in that it varies positively with the total, but it is quite different in that
it is skewed "left" rather than "right." The corresponding percentage distribution appears in Figure 2. At the bottom of the wealth distribution,
social security accounts for a very large share of total wealth, about 60
percent for the lowest decile, but its share declines to 7 percent among the
top ten percent of the wealth distribution. Conversely, the share of conventional assets rises steadily through the middle of the wealth distribution,
with social security's share declining in favor of private pensions and future
earnings.
An important dimension to consider is age, shown in Figure 3. The value
of future earnings declines with age as couples near retirement while the
value of social security benefits rises, mainly because discounting matters
less as one approaches the age of eligibility. Pensions change relatively little
across age in this sample. We do not investigate this issue further here, but it
appears that this is the result of two offsetting trends: a life-eycle increase in
pension wealth by age and a trend toward greater use of private pensions
among younger cohorts. Conventional assets also change rather little with
the age of the wife.

100%

..._..---....,...-....,...----r---r---,.---,.----......- ......--...,...-...,...--....,....,

80%

~

I

Irnsoc Sec

'0

eto
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1

b~Assetsl

.s:;
(J)

I

' o Earnings
.

60%

40%

20%

0%
30-50

10-30

0-10

50-70

70-90

90-100

Decile of Couple Wealth

Figure 2. Sources of HRS couple wealth by decile, share of total. Source: Authors'
calculations using HRS data.
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Figure 3. Sources ofHRS couple wealth by age of wife. Source: Authors' calculations
using HRS data.
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The Wealth of Prospective Widows
We now examine what wealth would be available to these HRS women if
their husbands had died suddenly around the time of the wave 1 interview.
We estimate that such a prospective widow would have about $620,000 on
average, with a median of $439,000. This implies that about 79 percent of
couple wealth is heritable by prospective widows. On the other hand, the
dispersion of widow wealth is greater than for couple wealth: the wealthiest
decile of widows would have 35 percent of the wealth (compared to 30
percent for couple wealth) and the Gini coefficient of prospective widow
wealth would be 0.44 (compared to 0.38 for couples).
If, instead, the wives died, the surviving husbands of these HRS women
would have average wealth of $659,000, with a median of $473,000. Thus,
they would be about 6 percent wealthier in widowhood than their wives on
average, a meaningful but not a large difference. Widower wealth would be
only slightly less unequally distributed than widow wealth: the share of the
top 10 percent is 34 percent and the Gini coefficient is 0.43.
The composition of wealth for prospective widows differs from the composition of couple wealth because of the differential life-contingencies or
inheritance rules governing the various assets. We assume that conventional
assets are fully heritable, so these take on greater importance for widows,
constituting 50 percent of total wealth on average, compared with 39 percent for couples. Social security benefits are slightly less important for widows than for couples at 16 percent, private pensions at 14 percent, and life
insurance policies on the husband account for 11 percent ofwidows, wealth.
Future earnings account for nine percent of widows' wealth (assuming widowed women do not take a job on becoming widowed).
Wealth composition also varies with the level of wealth, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. Looking at the absolute levels, conventional assets are even
more concentrated among the most wealthy widows than in the couple
distributions. Social security wealth is again relatively equally distributed
across the wealth classes, but here too it increases with total wealth up to the
middle of the distribution and never declines. Both pensions (partly inherited) and future earnings (of the widow only) increase steadily with total
wealth. Even more surprisingly, so does the value of life insurance policies,
which rises to an average level of over $200,000 for the richest decile of
widows. This pattern, in which life insurance seems to reinforce rather than
reduce the inequality of widow outcomes, is discussed at greater length
elsewhere (Weir and Willis 1996).
The evidence on shares of wealth reinforces these impressions. Social
security accounts for 68 percent of the wealth of the poorest prospective
widows, and only 5 percent of the richest. Life insurance, future earnings,
and pension income all show a gentle V-shaped pattern, rising in impor-
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Figure 4. Sources of HRS prospective widow wealth by decile, dollar value. Source:
Authors' calculations using HRS data_

tance into the middle of the distribution and falling off in the top wealth
deciles. Conventional assets increase in importance.
Patterns of prospective widow wealth by age of the wife are shown in
Figure 6. These patterns are similar to those for couple wealth (Figure 3).
Life insurance and future earnings are more important at younger ages and
decline steadily. Private pensions are relatively stable, while conventional
assets and social security increase in importance with age.
The ratio of the prospective widow's to the couple's wealth, which we call
the "inheritance rate," is shown in Figure 7 by source of wealth. The top
panel depicts rates according to the couple's place in the distribution of
couple wealth, and the rates prove to be fairly stable. By assumption, conventional assets are inherited at 100 percent so we do not show a curve for them.
Nevertheless, their influence is clearly visible in the upward trend of the
overall inheritance rate for total wealth (life insurance is included in the
widow's wealth total, but since its share of total widow's wealth is fairly stable
at around 9-12 percent it does not distort the pattern by wealth). Other
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Figure 5. Sources of HRS prospective widow wealth by decile, share of total. Source:
Authors' calculations using HRS data.
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dollar value. Source: Authors' calculations using HRS data.
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types of wealth are less than perfectly heritable: social security declines very
slightly with total wealth; the inherited share of pensions rises with couple
wealth, which means that the wife's own pensions and the husband's defined contribution pensions are an increasing share of the total; and wives
contribute a slightly greater share of household earnings in the poorest
households and a smaller share in the wealthiest.
The lower panel organizes the information according to the prospective
widow's place in the (hypothetical) distribution of widow's wealth. Here
differential inheritance rates across couples are more visible, showing that
widow poverty is not simply the sequel to couple poverty. In the bottom
decile of couple wealth, the average inheritance rate for all wealth was about
70 percent. In the bottom decile of widow outcomes, the average inheritance rate is only 50 percent. Social security's benefit rules ensure that
inheritance rates do not vary much. Private pensions show a more sharply
increasing pattern of inheritance rate by wealth. Earnings vary even more,
especially at the bottom of the distribution. The poorest widows have earnings that are less than 20 percent of couple earnings.

Sustainable Consumption Paths
We next convert the wealth stock measures into estimates of sustainable
individual consumption levels. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987),
we do this by calculating the individual single-life annuities that could be
purchased at actuarially fair rates. 5 Using the Social Security Administration's forecast life tables by age, sex, and birth cohort, we calculate for each
HRS respondent an annuity rate that converts his or her stock ofwealth into
an annual single-life annuity payment. The inverse of the annuity rate is
what used to be known as years' purchase - the multiple of the annuity
payment needed to purchase it. It is simply the price (capital sum required)
of a one-dollar annuity for life. For a single individual the sustainable consumption level is the present value of wealth PVR divided by the price of a
single-life annuity D. Thus:
Widow:

Widower:
Couples are slightly more complicated. To provide equal consumption
annuities to both spouses, the present value of a couple's resources is divided by the sum of their individual annuity prices. But the sustainable
consumption of a couple is not based on full couple wealth. As noted earlier,
life insurance has no effect on full couple wealth (when it is actuarially fair
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term insurance). That makes it appear as if buying life insurance for surviving spouses is costIess in terms of the consumption of the couple while
married, when in fact it is precisely the reduction in potential married
consumption that is the price paid for higher prospective widow consumption. The problem is to decide by how much to reduce the couple's available
wealth for consumption (or their consumption annuities) for the purchase
oflife insurance. The correct amount of wealth reduction is the discounted
value of all future life insurance premiums. To know this we would need to
solve a dynamic program solving for optimal insurance purchases in each
future year depending on the position of all other financial resources in
each future year. A simpler approach uses an approximation. Optimal life
insurance amounts can be expected to fall with age because the share oflifecontingent assets (notably earnings) declines. If the couple maintained
constant premiums at their current levels, they could buy slowly declining
amounts of (term) coverage which we expect would exceed their needs as
they enter retirement. We therefore deduct the annual premium reported
at HRS wave 1 from the couple's combined consumption annuity.
From this point, we could follow Auerbach and KotIikoff in comparing
the potential annuities of women as wives, to the potential annuities they
would be able to buy if they became widowed. The ratio of the two consumption annuities (widow/wife) is an index of adequacy of provision for widowhood. Before we do so, however, we need to consider what levels of consumption are needed in each state to produce the same standard of living.
This requires a discussion of equivalence scales.
Equivalence Scales

Equivalence scales refers to the consumption needs of households of different compositions expressed relative to some "standard" household type.
Developing these scales has represented a long-term challenge to economists and policy-makers alike. One debate concerns economies of scale in
consumption as household size increases. That is, in comparing couples to
surviving spouses, we collapse all aspects of gains to marriage into a greater
efficiency of consumption. If there were no scale economies, then two people need would twice as much income as a single person. If "two can live as
cheaply as one," then the income needed to support a widow at the same
standard of living would be identical to the couple's income. The truth lies
somewhere in between, but the range is enormous.
Equivalence scales estimated in or implied by previous work appear in
Table 4, recognizing that an equivalence scale can be expressed in different
ways. The first column of Table 4, following the most common format, shows
how much consumption (or income or expenditure) is needed by a couple
compared to a single person. The second column is simply the inverse:
it shows how a single person's needs compare to those of a couple. The
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TABLE

4: Consumption Ratios Implied by Different Equivalence Scales for the
Elderly
Consumption Ratios

Equivalenu Scale

Social Security 2-earner couple
German poverty threshold
Danziger et al. (couple/widow)
Citro-Michael
Social security l-earner couple
Merz (US)
Danziger et al. (couple/widower)
U.S. Poverty threshold

Two/One

One/Two

Widow/Wife

2.00
1.81
1.73
1.62
1.50
1.49
1.36
1.26

0.50
0.55
0.58
0.62
0.67
0.67
0.73
0.79

1.00
1.10
1.16
1.23
1.33
1.34
1.47
1.59

Source: Authors' calculations from data reported in Danziger et al. (1984), Table 3; Citro and
Michael (1995), pp. 165-82; and Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz (1996), Table l.
Note: The indicated consumption ratios (Two/One) are ratios ofthe amounts of consumption
expenditure needed to provide the same standard ofliving (or utility) for an elderly couple as
compared with a single individual over 65, according to the equivalence scales estimated by the
indicated author or embodied in the indicated policy rule.

third column expresses equivalence scales in terms of the ratios we will use
to compare our results with Auerbach and Kotlikoff's (1987) estimates:
namely, the ratio of a widow's consumption needs to that of a wife for the
same standard of living. This is simply the second column times two, based
on the assumption that a wife consumes one-half of the couple's total. Another equivalence is the U.S. government's poverty threshold, which assumes that a widow needs 79 percent of the income available to a married
couple to achieve the same standard of living. Assuming that she had half
the couple's consumption while married, her needs as a widow are 59 percent greater than they were as a wife. The German government's poverty
threshold assumes much smaller scale economies, where the widow is assumed to need only 55 percent of a couple's consumption, or about a 10
percent increase over her consumption while married. Citro and Michael
(1995) surveyed the literature of poverty studies to distill a "back-of-theenvelope" equivalence scale formula of n- 7 , where n is the number of persons in the household.
Other analysts have estimated equivalence scales allowing for differences
by sex. Danziger et al. (1984) find that men's needs are much greater than
women's when living alone, although both estimates detected lower scale
economies than the official poverty threshold. Unfortunately, the estimated
sex differences do not distinguish the elderly from younger age groups, and
so are almost certainly too large.
The Social Security Administration also has an implicit equivalence scale,
in that the nonworking spouse's benefit is equal to one-half of the earner's
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benefit, making the couple's income 1.5 times the earner's benefit. At the
death of either spouse, the survivor receives the earner's benefit. This leaves
a widow with two-thirds of the couple's social security income. However,
working women are treated differently. At widowhood the widow receives
the larger of her own or her spouse's benefit, and often this will be the husband's benefit. Thus the working widow is left in the same absolute position
as if she had not worked, and in a worse position relative to her consumption
in marriage. In the limit, if their individual benefits were equal, the surviving spouse receives only half the couple's social security benefits.

Widowhood and Consumption Ratios
The ratio of potential widows' to wives' consumption levels among HRS
women varies substantially across respondents to the 1992 study. Table 5
shows the cumulative fraction of women whose consumption possibilities as
widows would fall at or below a given threshold, as compared to their consumption as wives. The table also presents figures from 1962, derived from
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
We present these for couples in three initial wealth groups. Couples with
the lowest wealth are the ones we believe most relevant to the issue of widow
poverty. According to the official poverty equivalence scales described in the
previous section, a consumption ratio of 1.6 would be needed to keep a
widow above the poverty line if the couple was just at the poverty line when
the husband was alive. Relatively few women in low-income households
would see even a 50 percent increase as widows (82 percent in 1969 and 79
percent in 1992).
We also see an improvement in widows' consumption levels over time.
This is apparent at the more reasonable level of 1.25, corresponding to economic estimates of equivalence scales. Almost three-quarters of prospective
widows in low-wealth families failed to reach this level in 1969, compared
with only 55 percent in 1992. At consumption ratios of 1.0 or below, the
differences are even sharper. Less than one-quarter of women in 1992 faced
an absolute decline in their sustainable consumption, compared with 58
percent in 1969. These gains were even greater among the wealthier couples. The 1.25 consumption threshold was not reached by 75 percent of
middle-class and 60 percent of the top group in 1969, whereas only 39
percent and 20 percent failed to reach it in 1992. Taking all wealth categories together, the potential widow's median consumption ratio rose from
1.02 to 1.36 over the two decades, while that for men rose much less, from
1.73 to 1.83. Clearly provision for widows has improved substantially more
than for widowers.
One explanation for the observed changes over time arises from an examination of the composition of couple wealth. Even after adjusting for infla-
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TABLE 5: Wives Whose Potential Consumption in Widowhood Would Fall Below
a Given Ratio of Their Consumption in Marriage, by Wealth of Couple
and Year
Present Value of Couple 's Resources
Middle

Cumulative Fraction
with ConsurnfJtion
Ratio Below:

1969

1992

1969

1992

1969

1992

0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75

0.12
0.34
0.58
0.73
0.82
0.88

0.03
0.07
0.24
0.55
0.79
0.89

0.08
0.27
0.52
0.75
0.90
0.96

0.01
0.04
0.14
0.39
0.75
0.91

0.04
0.17
0.37
0.60
0.77
0.90

0.00
0.01
0.06
0.20
0.52
0.85

Low

High

Source: Authors' calculations from HRS data for 1992 and from Auerbach and Kodikoff (1987)
Table 4, based on the Retirement History Survey for 1969.
Note: The consumption ratio is the ratio of the sustainable consumption that would be available
to a woman if widowed to the sustainable consumption available to her while married. Both
samples have been stratified by current couple wealth: under the 20th percentile (low), 20th to
60th (middle), and high. Each column displays the cumulative distribution of consumption
ratios for a particular ~roup.

tion (using the CPI), older couples experienced substantial real growth in
all forms of wealth , with average total wealth rising from $416,000 in 1969 to
$788,000 in 1992 ($1992). Of course, what matters for the relative status of
widows is the life-contingent structure ofthat wealth, and here we find that
private pensions have increased substantially. Men's pensions accounted for
eight percent of couple wealth in 1969 but women's pensions were worth essentially zero. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) assumed that men's pensions
were strictly single-life annuities and not heritable. While spousal rights to
pensions were improved over time through several regulatory changes, the
increase in pensions is also key. Men's pensions were 12 percent of couple
wealth in 1992 and women's pensions nearly 5 percent, which means that
widows would retain nearly 11 percent of couple wealth in 1992 that they
had none of in 1969. Some of the time series change is also due to growing
conventional wealth, which rose from 37 percent of total couple wealth in
1969, to 39 percent in 1992. 6 Women's earnings have also increased relative
to men's, so the loss of a husband's income will now have less impact on the
prospective widow's wealth.
To what extent has life insurance enhanced women's protection against
economic losses in widowhood? The answer appears to be "not much."
Men's future earnings did become more completely insured over time
(from 43 to 59 percent). Their future earnings also fell as a share of couple
wealth (from 20 to 15 percent). The net result is that life insurance stayed at
about nine percent of the value of couple wealth.
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Prospective Poverty Rates

We are also interested in the absolute levels of resources available to wives
and widows, especially at the low end ofthe wellbeing scale. The distribution
of sustainable consumption levels of prospective widows and widowers relative to the official poverty thresholds for 1992 appears in Table 6. We find,
for example, that 6 percent of the age-eligible married women in the HRS
would, if widowed, have sustainable consumption levels below the official
poverty threshold for single persons, and two-thirds of them (4 percen t of
the total) would be below 60 percent of the couple poverty line (corresponding to the Danziger or Citro-Michael equivalence scale). By contrast,
only 3 percent of their husbands would be below the poverty line ifwidowed,
and only 4 percent ofthe age-eligible married men in the HRS.
We must emphasize that these estimates are likely to underpredict future
poverty rates for several reasons. Official poverty rates are based on a particular and restrictive definition of annual income received, whereas our
estimates of sustainable consumption levels are derived from estimates of
lifetime wealth whenever it was or will be earned. For example, the poverty
measure does not include as income the annual rental value of home ownership. Table 6 gives some indication of this effect by reporting the distribution of sustainable consumption when the value of home equity is excluded
from the definition of wealth. The inclusion of housing wealth moves many
people up a category in the middle of the distribution (where housing
equity is quantitatively important), but has less impact at the bottom near
the official poverty threshold (where housing wealth is small). Almost nine
percent of women would be below the poverty line if their housing wealth
was excluded from their available consumption as widows.
We also examine how excluding other components of wealth (one at a
time) affects sustainable consumption. These are calculations simply intended to give an idea of the relative importance of the different resources
available to people at risk of poverty, and they do not assume behavioral
responses to changes in policies or programs. Social security is the most
important of the four wealth components considered here. Without social
security, the simulation indicates that there would be nearly three times as
many widows in poverty (17 percent). Its proportional effects on men's
prospective poverty rates are about the same as for women. But since men's
poverty rates are lower, social security substantially reduces the differences
in poverty rates between widows and widowers.
Earlier we assumed that a spouse's defined benefit pension could be
inherited at 50 percent. This proves not to be very important, and if pensions were eliminated entirely it would have little effect on poverty rates.
That is because pensions only amount to about five percent of the wealth of
couples at the bottom of the wealth distribution. Consequently, policies to
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TABLE 6: Prospective HRS Widow(er)s Who Would Have Sustainable Consumption
Levels Below the Indicated Thresholds, by Wealth Definition
Cumulative Fraction
with Consumption
Threshold Below:

Excludingfrorn Widow(er) Wealth
Nothing

Housing

Spouse DB
Pensions

Social
Secu'rity

Life
Insurance

0.041
0.062
0.131
0.229
0.585

0.052
0.086
0.204
0.323
0.672

0.046
0.072
0.157
0.265
0.631

0.125
0.171
0.284
0.386
0.684

0.049
0.078
0.167
0.285
0.657

0.020
0.032
0.070
0.118
0.415

0.030
0.046
0.104
0.183
0.526

0.021
0.032
0.074
0.124
0.427

0.073
0.103
0.170
0.246
0.554

0.022
0.037
0.076
0.137
0.445

0.030
0.044
0.084
0.133
0.405

0.042
0.058
0.114
0.182
0.489

0.030
0.045
0.087
0.139
0.413

0.076
0.099
0.159
0.233
0.511

0.032
0.049
0.092
0.151
0.431

Age-elegible wornen

.6*PL(2)
PL(I)
1.5*PL(l)
2*PL(I)
4*PL(l)
Their husbands

.6*PL(2)
PL(I)
1.5*PL(1 )
2*PL(l)
4*PL(I)
Age-eligilble men

.6*PL(2)
PL(I)
1.5*PL(I)
2*PL(I)
4*PL(I)

Soune: Authors' calculations using HRS data.
Noles: PL( 1) is the poverty line for a single person ($7,299 in 1992) PL(2) is the poverty line for

a couple ($9,443 in 1992). N=3362 age-eligible married women in the HRS Wave I, and the
same number of husbands. Frequencies are weighted using the wife's person-level weight
(inverse of sampling probability).
=3577 age-eligible married men, with frequencies
weighted using man's person-level weight. Each column within a panel displays the cumulative
distribution of consumption levels for a particular definition of wealth available to support
consumption. See also Table 2.

increase the heritability of pensions might affect the well-being of the middle class, but they would not do much to alleviate poverty.
Life insurance reduces the prospective widow poverty rate from eight
percent to six percent. It is therefore not entirely absent from the financial
plans of even the poorest couples. As yet we cannot say how much more it
might do, until we examine whether consumption could have been transferred from the married state to the prospective widow state.
The distribution of widow(er) consumption levels for different initial
couple consumption levels appears in Table 7. We find that poor couples
rarely produced potential widows that escaped poverty. Husbands fared little better, so it is unlikely that such persons could have purchased life insurance. Also troubling is the fate of couples within 150 percent of the poverty
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TABLE 7: Prospective HRS Widow(er)s Who Would Have Sustainable Consumption Levels
Below the Indicated Thresholds, by Position of Couple
Cumulative Fraction
with Widow(er)'s
Consumption
Threshold Below:

Couple's Sustainable Consumption Relative to Poverty Th1-eshold
<PL(2)

PL(2)-1.5*
PL(2)

1.5*PL(2)
-2*PL*(2)

2*PL(2)
-4*PL(2)

>4*PL(2)

All

0.814
0.914
0.968
0.987
1.000

0.338
0.599
0.921
0.968
1.000

0.048
0.138
0.579
0.849
0.993

0.006
0.013
0.084
0.282
0.940

0.000
0.001
0.002
0.007
0.192

0.041
0.062
0.131
0.229
0.585

.6*PL(2)
PL(I)
1.5*PL( 1)
2*PL(I)
4*PL(I)

0.589
0.857
0.972
1.000
1.000

0.071
0.147
0.761
0.949
0.996

0.009
0.024
0.151
0.579
1.000

0.000
0.000
0.012
0.050
0.699

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.033

0.020
0.032
0.070
0.118
0.415

Weighted number
of couples

98

122

206

1308

1628

3362

Age-elegible women

.6*PL(2)
PL(I)
1.5*PL(I)
2*PL(l)
4*PL(I)
Their husbands

Source: Authors' calculations using HRS data.
Notes: PL(l) is the poverty line for a single person ($7,299 in 1992) PL(2) is the poverty line for a couple
($9,443 in 1992). Frequencies are weighted using the wife's person-level weight (inverse of sampling
probability). The couple's sustainable annual consumption level is reduced by the (actuarially fair)
premia they would need to pay per year for the current amount of lite insurance in force. Each column
within a panel displays the cumulative distribution of consumption levels for a particular definition of
wealth available to support consumption. See also Table 2.

line. Sixty percent of the wives in that group would fall below the singleperson poverty threshold if widowed, as compared with only 15 percent of
their husbands. This is evidence of vulnerability to poverty differing by sex.

Characteristics of the Vulnerable
To explore in greater detail who is at risk of poverty or substantial economic
loss at widowhood, we offer an overview description of howat-risk women
differ from those not at risk. As we have already seen, the poorest prospective
widows are much more likely to come from poor families in which the husband also faces poverty in widowhood. This effect is reinforced in Table 8 by
the direct relationship between level of wealth and its life-eontingent structure. The Auerbach-Kotlikoffwidow/wife annuity ratios are lowest for poor
widows and rise with widow's well-being. Thus, in addition to being poor,
poor households transfer smaller proportions of their wealth to a widow. A

TABLE

8: Characteristics of HRS Marriages by Prospective Widow's Consumption
Widow's Sustainable Consumption Relative to Poverty Threshold
<.6*PL(2)

Couple poverty rate (%)
Widower poverty rate (%)
No future earnings (%)
White (%)
Health limits work (%)
Education (years)
Age (years)
Avg. past earnings ($/year)
Wife annuity ($/year)
Widow annuity ($/year)
Widower annuity ($/year)
Widow/Wife annuity (%)
Widow /Widower annuity (%)
N of couples
Nweighted

57.5
54.1
83.8
59.0
49.5
9.6
54.9
3197
4766
3691
7784
77.4
47.4
187
138.6

.6·*PL(2)
-PL(l)

14.0
21.3
67.8
63.5
39.8
10.1
55.2
3215
7132
6507
11367
91.2
57.2
86
70.4

PL(l)
-1.5*PL(l)

2.3
5.4
49.5
69.1
34.4
10.5
55.3
4692
9511
9156
15735
96.3
58.2
282
229.9

1.5*PL(l)
-2*PL *(1)

0.5
1.1
46.2
82.3
21.1
11.3
56.1
5502
11933
12786
20891
107.2
61.2
360
331.1

2*PL(1)
-4*PL(1)

>4'*PL(l)

0.1
0.1
33.4
88.4
18.2
12.0
56.1
7724
16423
21426
29353
130.5
73.0
1187
1195.9

0.0
0.0
32.3
93.1
10.2
13.6
56.3
9881
38614
60810
77411
157.5
79.6
1260
1386.1

Source: Authors' calculations using HRS data.
Notes: PL(l) is the poverty line for a single person ($7,299 in 1992); PL(2) is the poverty line for a couple ($9,443 in 1992). Dollar amounts
are all in 1992 dollars. All calculations are weighted by the wife's person-level weight (inverse of sampling probability).
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major part of this effect is the amount of financial assets, but if that were
the only issue it should affect husbands and wives equally. Annuity ratios
of widows/widowers suggest that gender inequality is greatest among the
poorest prospective widows.
Another important determinant of the life-eontingent structure of fan1ily
wealth is the woman's earnings potential. The great majority of prospectively poor widows have zero projected earnings, while most of the more
secure women have positive future earnings. We note that these projections
are based on current earnings and respondents' stated intentions for future
work; no potential changes that might result from the death of a spouse are
incorporated. However, there may be little potential for increased labor
supply after widowhood. Nearly half of the HRS wives who would be the
poorest widows report that they already have health problems limiting their
ability to do paid work, as compared with only 10 percent of wives with the
best prospects for widowhood. An education deficit of almost four years
separates the poorest from the most comfortable of the prospective widows,
which also constrains the potential for future employment. Finally, these
women's prior earnings history is consistent with a pessimistic prediction.
Based only on women whose records were linked to social security records,
the most vulnerable women had average lifetime earnings only about onethird as high as those with the best prospects.
The age differences in Table 8 are surprisingly large: wives projected to be
poorest as widows are a full year younger than those with the highest incomes. One explanation for this is that younger women have longer to wait
to receive social security benefits which, as we have seen, are the mainstay of
retirement wealth for the poorest families. In our calculations, a given level
of annual (expected future) social security benefits beginning at age 62
translates into less wealth (present discounted value) for a younger woman,
because the benefits are discounted over more years. Younger women may
think that widowhood is unlikely before they reach social security age, or
that if it did occur they could make it through to social security age on some
combination of increased work, family transfers, or government aid. We
therefore computed how many women would be above the poverty line
once they reached age 62. Table 6 shows that roughly six percent of HRS
wives would have insufficient wealth to sustain a lifetime of consumption
over the poverty line if they had been widowed around 1992. Of these
women, 18 percent were entitled to social security benefits at age 62 that
would put them above poverty. An additional nine percent would be above
poverty after age 62 if they could preserve their other assets until they
reached age 62. Annual social security benefits would be higher if they were
claimed at the normal retirement age of 65: roughly 35 percent of the
poorest widows would then be above the poverty line from social security
alone, and nearly half would be if they did not consume their other assets
until then. In addition to underlining once again the importance of social
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security in keeping the elderly out of poverty, these estimates point to the
importance of choices made in the years immediately before social security
eligibility in determining economic status after retirement.
Avoiding premature consumption of retirement assets is even more important for women not at risk of poverty. Among the 94 percent of wives not
initially at risk for poverty in widowhood, fully 28 percent are entitled to age
62 social security benefits that are below poverty level; at 65, 16 percent are
below this level. Private resources are therefore critically important in preventing poverty, and unexpected losses of future earnings or assets between
now and retirement put many additional women at risk.

Conclusion
Our goal has been to direct attention to a relatively neglected but critically
important aspect of married couples' financial resources: namely, the lifecontingent structure of assets. Based on the rules governing transmission of
different components of family wealth, we assess how much wealth would
likely be available from current marriages to widows or widowers. This prospective analysis of the finances of currently married couples focuses attention on current decisions that influence what will happen after the spouse's
death.
Our results using the 1992 HRS may be compared with the older analysis
by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). We find that wives today, if widowed,
would retain a substantially greater share of their marital consumption as
compared to 20 years ago. Men also do somewhat better, but the gender gap
has narrowed considerably. It appears that much of the change is due to
private pension wealth and its heritability, along with the rise in women's
earnings and financial assets. Another explanation is that life insurance
coverage of husbands' earnings increased at the same time husbands' earnings fell, resulting in less uninsured loss of husbands' income.
While a couple's overall wealth level is key in reducing the risk of widows'
poverty, it is not the only factor. In particular, the composition of couples'
wealth matters, too. Women with low earnings and low labor force participation are the most vulnerable. In addition, having low earnings is strongly
correlated with characteristics such as poor health and low education, so
poor women are also least likely to be able to respond to widowhood by
increasing their future earnings.
Our results cast some doubt on the poten tial to solve the problem of poverty by reforming pensions or social security alone. Enhancing the heritability of assets between spouses could be justified for the middle class, on the
grounds that men's potential consumption as widowers is on average substantially greater than that available to their widows. This reform would not
have much effect on poverty rates, however, because of the small amounts of
pension wealth available for inheritance in poor couples. Similar limitations
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apply to a plan to increase social security survivor benefits: its effect would
be greatest on families well-removed from the risk of poverty. More redistribution could be imposed within social security: survivor benefit replacement rates are now the same for everyone (100 percent), but they
could be made a function of income. There are good arguments against
introducing means-testing into social security, however, leaving the current
system of Supplemental Security Income as the most efficient means to
target assistance to the needy elderly (see Manchester, forthcoming; Newmark and Powers, forthcoming) .
Observed patterns of life insurance purchase by couples nearing retirement pose a puzzle for the life-eycle model of insurance demand and for
policies built on its predictions. Life insurance in principle offers a tool to
smooth consumption across the future states of the world. In practice, it
appears instead to exaggerate consumption differences. This is because life
insurance is purchased most heavily by the wealthy and healthy (Weir and
Willis 1996). A potential explanation for this might be that life insurers
price-discriminate against those who seek to purchase small quantities of
insurance. Term life insurance prices per dollar of coverage decline as the
quantity purchased increases, and this pattern is only partly explained by
fixed administrative costs per policy (Cawley and Philipson 1996). Because
low-income workers lacking employment-based access to group rates are at
most risk to leave a widow in poverty, insurance access and pricing should
receive more attention in future work.
Future research should also delve further into the consumption patterns
of the elderly. If the official poverty index overstates economies of scale
among couples, and thereby overstates the needs of unmarried individuals,
then evidence on poverty among elderly widows may be seriously exaggerated. Conversely, if elderly couples enjoy important economies of scale, a
redesign of social security benefits and other policy reforms may be needed
to better insure against the loss of those scale economies with the loss of
a spouse. Future research should also explore whether and how couples
nearing retirement think about the life-eontingent structure of their asset
claims, or of the tradeoffs they face among differently structured annuities.
Finally, our analysis thus far relies on analysis of the baseline HRS interview, which is but a single cross-section. In future research we will reexamine
HRS respondents in the longitudinal file, to compare actual olltcomes of
loss of spouse with our predictions. This will help us say, with much greater
certainty, whether the apparent improvement in married couples' financial
provision for widowhood over the last 20 years will further reduce poverty
among elderly widows over the next 20 years.
Olivia Mitchell and Steven Venti provided valuable guidance in the use of
social security and pension records, as well as helpful comments. We are also
grateful for the comments of Alan Gustman, Paul Menchik, Janles Smith,
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Steven Sandell, David Wise, and participants in the 1997 NBER Summer
Institute on Aging. Honggao Cao provided research assistance. This research was supported by the NIA (UOI-AG09740; KOI-AG00703).

Notes
1. Current-status poverty rates may reflect selection effects: if poorer couples are
more likely to be widowed and/ or if poor widows are less likely to remarry, this will
increase the observed gap between widows and the still married. There is some
evidence that the loss of a spouse is often a precipitating event in the transition to
poverty, however. Hurd (1990: 583-84), using the Retirement History Study (RHS),
reports that 37 percent of women who were widowed from a nonpoor marriage in
1975 were below the poverty line as widows in 1977, compared with only 4 percent of
women whose husbands survived. Becoming widowed also reduced the chances of
leaving poverty over that interval from 50 percent for couples to 15 percent for
widows. Research using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics also found that the
income-to-needs ratio declined after retirement at about the same rate for couples
and for men who lost their wives, but it felI more quickly for widows (Burkhauser and
Duncan 1991). The death of a spouse is clearly a more economicalIy harmful event
for women than for men (Burkhauser, Butler, and Holden 1991).
2. A detailed data Appendix is available from the authors on request.
3. The actual inher-itance patterns of widows may vary_ For instance, a couple may
choose to give bequests to other heirs rather than the widow, and some debts may be
avoided after the spouse dies.
4. Mortality is known to vary by income and ethnicity, and this can have important
effects on the present value of similar future income streams (Panis and LilIard
1996). Individual survival probabilities may also depend on the survival of the
spouse, with death rates increasing after loss of a spouse (Lillard and Panis 1996).
The HRS also contains substantial amounts of health information on individuals,
including questions about individuals' own survival expectations. In related work we
are examining the effects of differential survival probabilities (Weir and Willis 1996),
but much remains to be done. Note, however, that the effect of such mortality
differentials is substantially reduced by our subsequent transformation ofwealth into
sustainable consumption levels.
5. This approach implicitly sets loads to zero.
6. Some of this increase may reflect improved wealth assessment in the HRS
compared with the RHS data set used in the earlier analysis.
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